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The Left Radical of Afghanistan [
Chap-e Radikal-e Afghanistan]:




Introduction: why examine the Left Radical of
Afghanistan?
1 For many analysts of Afghanistan, the importance of leftist political ideology came to an
end with the reformulation of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) [Hezb-
e Demokratic-e Khalq-e Afghanistan], the ostensibly communist party of government, as the
Homeland Party of Afghanistan [Hezb-e-Watan-e Afghanistan] in 1987.1 This event, along
with removal of Soviet troops in 1989, the ouster of President Najibullah’s in 1992, and his
eventual  execution  in  1996,  has  meant  that  Afghanistan’s  political  development  has
tended to be analysed in relation to the success and failures of the Mujahedeen, the rise,
fall  and rise  of  the  Taleban and the  implications  of  US  and NATO intervention and
occupation. In counterpoint to this focus, this article sets out to examine the question of
how left-wing political  movements  in  Afghanistan have  adapted and changed in  the
period  after  the  fall  of  the  PDPA  and  Soviet  Union.  This  will  be  achieved  through
examining  the  ideological  and  organisational  trajectory  of  a  group  of  workers  and
activists  operating  under  the  label  of  the  Left  Radical  of  Afghanistan  (LRA)  [Chap-e
Radikal-e Afghanistan].2 The LRA is a small, urban political group and workers’ association
that traces its history to the Afghan Maoist tradition.3 Their activists are predominately
based in Kabul and appear to have little engagement with ‘tribal’ or rural politics outside
of the capital city. They are predominately Dari speakers and their activists refuse to
identify themselves as  anything other than ‘Afghan’ when requested to discuss  their
ethnic background.4 It is a movement that draws its members from the urban working-
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class in Kabul,  with activists coming from lower socio-economic backgrounds and,  in
addition, it does not appear to be connected to groups from the intelligentsia or middle-
class.5
2 Due to its politics and history, the LRA have no connections to groups close to power and
influence;  they have modest finances and no significant internal  or external political
support. As a result, the LRA have little chance of creating significant political agitation
amongst the Afghan working-class. This all points towards the apparent conclusion that
the  LRA  is  a  minor  movement  which  offers  scholars  only  limited  insight  into  the
trajectory  of  mainstream Afghan politics.  However,  this  article  argues  that  the  very
existence of such a grassroots workers’ association in Kabul warrants closer inspection
for three main reasons. First, it provides evidence that underground leftist activity and
agitation can be re-articulated as a radical movement away from power, with political
activities  focused  on international  solidarity  and organisation  of  workers.  Second,  it
highlights that not all current political movements in Afghanistan are either grassroots
Islamic movements (i.e. the Taleban and its offshoots), elite-led movements built around
a leader (whether a technocrat such as President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai or a ‘warlord’
such as Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum) or entrenched movements that first came to
significance in the 1960s (i.e. Hezb-e Islami, Jamiat-e Islami etc.). Third, the LRA’s revision of
its revolutionary ideology through renouncing its Maoist past in favour of a Trotsky-
influenced, internationalist political ideology is a reformulation that positions the LRA
apart from other known Afghan leftist political groups.6
3 In order to undertake research on the LRA, the author has engaged in activities based
around cultivating contacts with members and affiliates of the movement. This included
conducting  structured  and  semi-structured  interviews  with  activists,  taking  part  in
clandestine meetings and studying the content of their available political writings. In
order to use this information, the article utilises a method of analysis that approaches the
words, both written and spoken, of LRA activists as being inherently meaningful, with the
goal being to use its statements as a reflection of its ideological position. Triangulation of
information on the LRA is a relatively difficult task for a number of reasons, including the
fact that the LRA operates as an underground movement,  does not regularly publish
materials in Dari or Pashto, let alone any European languages, and, as a working class
political association, has limited educated, middle-class members with the time and/or
inclination to publish pamphlets or propaganda. Its very nature as a workers’ association
and proto-political party makes it difficult to analyse, but this article attempts to make
best use of the, admittedly limited, documentary evidence to present an initial sketch of
the  LRA’s  origins,  ideological  development  and  political  activities.  The  article  is  not
intended to be read as a definitive history of leftist movements in Afghanistan, or even
the LRA itself, but aims to provide a biographical sketch analysed against the background
of Afghan political history and wider developments of leftist ideology.
4 The question of what tribal, regional or ethnic affiliations undergird both leaders and
members  of  political  movements  is  one  frequently  encountered  by  researchers  of
Afghanistan.  With  regards  to  the  LRA,  their  stated  position  is  that  they  repudiate
tribalism and ethnicity for the primacy of class struggle and that they have ‘the honour of
having members from all ethnicities and most of the provinces of Afghanistan.’7 When
requested during a meeting in 2013, LRA members refused to answer questions on their
ethnicity and reiterated, as Loyand most recently stated, that they welcome people ‘from
all ethnic backgrounds.’8 In fact, when the question of ethnicity was posed, the chair of
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the meeting asked directly: ‘why do foreigners always talk about ‘Pashtun’ or ‘Tajik’ or
‘Uzbek’? We are Afghan.’9 If one accepts the LRA’s adherence to class-struggle, and the
author’s  position  as  a  foreign  observer,  their  reticence  to  provide  a  clear  ethnic
categorisation of their members is  understandable.  In fact,  it  can be argued that the
continued focus on ethnicity as a key marker of Afghan identity is symptomatic of the
longstanding (and ongoing) colonial  imagining of  the inhabitants of  the geographical
space of ‘Afghanistan’ initially implemented by the British Government under the guise of
the  East  India  Company  in  the  early  nineteenth-century  (Hopkins 2008,  Bayly 2013).
However,  with  regards  to  categorising  the  ethnic  and  sociological  makeup  of  LRA
members, it is possible to make the following reflections. The LRA claim that all ethnic
groups are accepted and included as a result of their belief in the primacy of promoting
class-struggle.  Their  members  are  working-class  men  with  manual  labour  jobs  and
women do not appear to be included in the group discussion environment.10 Religion is
not discussed as a mode of analysis, but it is accepted that the members are all Muslims,
even if  this  is  not  a  specific  requirement.11 Participants  appear  to  have little  formal
education, bar two student participants and a teacher who were the youngest members of
the group. The language of discussion at meetings is Dari and, other than one participant
from  Nangarhar  province  and  one  student  living  and  studying  in  India,  all  other
participants in the political discussions appear to be based in Kabul.12
5 The article will explore the formation, development and ideological journey of the LRA as
a political movement and will be split into two broad sections. In the first section, it will
provide  context  through  presenting  an  historical  overview  of  left-wing  politics  in
Afghanistan and will provide a brief summary of the status of left-wing political thought
and organisation in Afghanistan in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
PDPA. In the second section, the article will go on to explore the historical development
of  the  LRA in  order  to  position  it  within  the  framework  of  left-wing  thought  in
Afghanistan. Subsequently, it will examine the ideology of the LRA as articulated in its
own statements  and will  scrutinise  it  in  reference to  Trotskyist  thought  in  order  to
identify its political lineage. Finally, the article will examine the LRA’s current political
activities  in  order  to  provide  evidence  of  how they  utilise  direct  political  action  to
implement their ideological beliefs before, in the conclusion, arguing for the relevance of
researching and studying a movement such as the LRA.
 
Left-wing political thought and organisation in
Afghanistan
6 This section will present a short overview of the historical development of proto-leftist
and leftist organisation and thought in Afghanistan in order to provide context to the
founding  of  the  LRA.13 Afghanistan  was  governed  by  the  PDPA,  a  self-declared
revolutionary party that adhered to tenets of  Marxist-Leninist  thought,  from 1978 to
1992.  This  period of  rule  came about  after  a  military coup on 27 April  1978 and its
immediate  replacement  by a  civilian government  led by Nur Mohammad Taraki  and
Hafizullah Amin; a series of events dubbed the ‘Saur Revolution’ by its proponents. The
organised  leftist  movement  that  led  to  the  Saur  Revolution  came  about  through
grassroots political organisation that took place on the university campuses in the major
cities during the 1960s; however this was not the starting point for leftist agitation and
influence  in  Afghanistan.  Involvement  of  the  Bolsheviks  in  the  1920s  during  the
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subjugation of the Basmachi movement and the annexation of the autonomous Khanates
of Khiva, Bokhara and Khokand (Bennigsen & Wimbush 1979), as well as rising political
turmoil  in British India,  were external  factors that led to the spread of  the ideas of
revolution,  socialism  and  communism  throughout  Afghanistan  (Marwat 1997).  In
addition, the involvement of Afghans in the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East in
1920 suggests that left-wing thought in Afghanistan also has a domestic economic and
social  base and that,  since the October Revolution of  1917,  there have been Afghans
committed to reform and leftist agitation (Dupree 1979: 2).14
7 The exact implications of early communist agitation in Afghanistan have not, as yet, been
uncovered and the first indications of proto-left-wing political organisation appear to
have originated in the aftermath of World War II. In this volatile period, Afghans began to
organise in groups that showed characteristics similar to post-colonial national liberation
movements that based their ideas around reform of society. Two significant movements
related to the development of left-wing political  organisation included the Awakened
Youth [Wesh Dzalmian]  and the Secret  Unity  Party  [Hezb-e  Seri  Itehad],  both of  which
showed characteristics of organisation and ideology that would be seen later in Afghan
revolutionary political movements. Wesh Dzalmian was a largely Pashtun organisation that
evolved into something resembling a proto-political party in the early 1950s and, it has
been  argued,  provided  the  domestic  blueprint  of  political  organisation  for  other
politically minded Afghans (Ruttig 2006). Hezb-e Seri Itehad was an underground political
movement that, according to Behzan, sought to overthrow the monarchy of Afghanistan
in order to establish a republic. It was formed around the ideas of ‘Sayyid Ismail Balkhi, a
Shiite leader from the north, and Khwaja Muhammad Naim, the powerful Sunni police
commissioner  of  Kabul,’  with  their  objectives  being to  ‘kill  the  prime minister,  arm
members of the party, release prisoners, and take the national radio station and the royal
palace’  (Behzan  2012: 446-449).  This  political  environment  was  the  precursor  to  the
establishment of two important proto-parties of the Left: the Fatherland Party [Hezb-e
Watan] and the People’s Party [Hezb-e Khalq]. These parties should perhaps be seen as the
forbearers of organised leftist movement with both Watan and Khalq,  as Ruttig notes,
offering policies with a leftist hue such as: ‘national government, free elections and the
establishment of political parties,’ although it was Hezb-e Khalq that had the ‘somewhat
more left leaning agenda, adding ‘social justice’ and the ‘fight against exploitation’ to the
demand for democratic rights’ (Ruttig 2006: 5).
8 Nonetheless,  it  was  not  until  the  1960s  student  movements  that  left-wing  political
thought became entrenched in Afghan intellectual circles. At this time it became possible
to  see  discernible  left-wing  ideology,  organisational  remit  and  potential  for  mass
mobilisation  coalesce  among  Afghans  seeking  radical  social,  political  and  economic
change. It was from this point that the two main ideological trends of the Afghan Left can
be broadly categorised. The first trend were the Marxist-Leninists, some of whom formed
the PDPA in 1965,  which split  into two factions:  Khalq [the masses] and Parcham [the
banner]  before reuniting in 1977.  The second trend were the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
(MLM) movement, with the main current being formed around the Progressive Youth
Organisation [Sazman-e Jawanan-e Mutaraqi], known as Eternal Flame [Shola Jawid], after
the political organ of the party (Emadi 2001: 433-40). At this time, when radical leftist
groups outside these two broad traditions were gaining traction in the West (as seen
through the development of  the ‘New Left’  ideological  tradition and the factionalism
within Communist parties after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956), there appears to
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have been no organised Afghan movements based on following the teachings of Trotsky
or any trend that could be accurately described as ‘anti-Stalinist.’15 Indeed, Afghanistan’s
leftist movement appeared to be tied to the debates that raged between the followers of
Stalin and Mao in the 1930s and 40s.
9 Once in power the PDPA, under the direction of the Khalqis, drew rhetorical inspiration
from the October Revolution and saw their goal as creating a workers’ state based around
a centralised Politburo and top-down revolution, whereby reforms were enforced by the
political elite at the expense of political and social cohesion (Halliday 1978). After the
assassination of Taraki and his replacement by Amin, the Soviet Union invaded, replaced
the ruling Khalqis  and imposed elites from Parcham, led initially by Babarak Karmal
(1979-1986) and, lastly, by Mohammad Najibullah (1986-1992). What took place during the
period of PDPA rule can best be described as tumultuous and contested, as the PDPA and
the  Soviet  Union  fought  a  war  against  the  foreign-backed,  yet  popular,  uprising  of
Mujahedeen. By the mid-80s both the PDPA and the USSR appeared to have accepted that
enforced political  reform should be shelved in order to promote policies of  ‘national
reconciliation’ that they believed could lead to peace between the government and their
opponents (Najibullah 2011). The revolutionary fervour of 1978 quickly faded amidst the
reality of the lack of a revolutionary social base, the existence of radical resistance to
PDPA rule, the difficulties involved in achieving social change, factional infighting, overt
Soviet control and regular authoritarian and brutal crackdowns on Maoist, Mujahedeen
and other ‘counter-revolutionaries’—or simply ‘enemies’  as they were often described
(Halliday & Tanin 1998).
10 Revolutionaries from a Maoist background had generally rejected the Saur Revolution
and called for a revolution based around a peasant-led rural uprising that would draw
inspiration from the developments  that  led to  the Chinese Revolution in 1946.  Shola
espoused an oppositionist radical left perspective, which claimed that the PDPA should be
seen as a revisionist  party of  Soviet imperialism that had inaccurately portrayed the
status of the Afghan peasantry and working class. For Shola, Afghanistan was a feudal
country that required revolution to be led by radicalised peasants; all other policies of
revolution were doomed to failure (Ibrahimi 2012: 2). Divisions between the Maoists and
the PDPA were always apparent, but became deeply entrenched after 1978 when Maoist
groups  became  active  members  of  the  anti-government  rebellion  and  fought  in  the
resistance against the PDPA and its Soviet patrons. Opposition to the PDPA was a widely
accepted  position  among Maoists  due  to  their  ideological  differences  and the  brutal
crackdown their movement faced under PDPA rule. However, there appears to have been
deep concern amongst a small portion of Maoists regarding the alliance forged between
leftist revolutionaries and radical Islamists during the Mujahedeen years.16 These debates
continued to rage among Maoists in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union
and  the  PDPA,  and  provided  the  backdrop  to  the  decision-making  of  left-wing
revolutionaries in the ‘post-communist’ era.
11 In effect,  very few of the Saur Revolution’s objectives were implemented,  millions of
Afghans were killed, and the cause of social and economic justice was set back many
years. What took place under PDPA rule was, as Rubin noted, a ‘failure of revolution from
above’ (2002: 111-21). This spectacular and disastrous failure has meant that, ever since,
the Afghan Left have had to reconcile their normative political beliefs with the reality of
history. The governing ideology of the PDPA underwent a process of attempted reform
during  the  period  after  1987  when  the  party,  under  the  leadership  of  the  Parcham
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President Najibullah, became known as the Homeland Party of Afghanistan [Hezb-e Watan-
e Afghanistan],  and effectively renounced socialism in favour of proto-nationalism and
‘national unity’  (Rogh 2001).  This led to a further deepening of divisions between the
factions of Khalq and Parcham and, in March 1990, a coup led by Minister of Defence and
Khalqi  Shah  Nawaz  Tanai  was  attempted,  but  defeated  (Bodansky  &  Forrest 1990).
Eventually,  in  March 1992,  and as  a  result  of  a  lack of  domestic  support  and,  more
importantly,  the lack of external support from the newly post-communist Russia,  the
United States or the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
remnants of the PDPA fell and a transitional Mujahedeen government was proclaimed
(Dorronsoro 2007: §4).
12 The radical Islamist ideology of the apparently victorious Mujahedeen factions, combined
with their belief in the myth that their actions destroyed the Soviet Union, ensured that
the rump movements of the Left had to operate in isolation, away from the state and
political power during the 1990s. The culmination of these domestic and international
political developments created the conditions for the continued splintering of the Left
into  ever  smaller  groups  with  limited  power  or  organisational  remit  within  Afghan
society. However, even though the Left was marginalised and occupied a space outside of
the structures of power now controlled by the Mujahedeen factions,  the ideas of the
leftist  tradition still  held traction amongst small groups who remained committed to
upholding the same ideological beliefs.  At this point,  leftist groups (whether drawing
lineage from the ruling PDPA or oppositionist Maoist backgrounds) that did not renounce
their beliefs in full either reformed their political ideology (mainly, but not exclusively,
along nationalist lines) or reconvened as political discussion circles in Afghanistan or in
exile.17
13 The formation of  leftist  exile  groups  in  Pakistan and Europe was  significant  for  the
continuation of leftist thought and organisation after 1992. These groups played a key
role in enabling leftist cadres and party members to remain collectivised as well as in
providing a base through which they could continue to formulate ideas and policies. After
Afghanistan was invaded by the US and its allies in 2001 and the Taleban government was
removed,  many  of  these  groups  felt  it  was  possible  to  operate  in  the  ostensibly
democratic environment. As such a number of these exile groups re-formed, either as
official  parties  or  underground  movements  and,  although  forced  to  renounce  their
socialist  views  should  they  wish  to  become  legally  registered,  continued  to  call  for
Afghanistan’s social and economic structure to be reformed. Some of the groups that
reformulated their  views in  this  period include:  the direct  successors  to  Najibullah’s
Parcham faction of  the PDPA, the Democratic Homeland Party of  Afghanistan [Hezb-e
Milli-e Watan-e Afghanistan], which can be said to propose a nationalist-leftist vision of
Afghanistan;18 the Afghanistan Peace Movement [De Afghanistan De Solay Ghorzang Gond]
led  by  ex-Khalqi  PDPA  Defense  Minister  Shah  Nawaz  Tanai,  which  has  a  somewhat
Pashtun nationalist-leftist ideology;19 the Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (SPA) [Hezb-e
Hambastagi-e  Afghanistan],  a  radical-leftist  oppositionist  group,20 and  the  Communist
(Maoist) Party of Afghanistan [Hezb-e Komunist-e (Ma’uist) Afghanistan], which is one of the
main  Maoist  oppositional  parties  with  direct  lineage  to  Shola.  While  this  is  not  an
exhaustive list of the leftist successor movements in Afghanistan, it goes some way to
show that, far from disappearing from the political scene, reformulated movements that
adhered to revised political ideals of leftist reform continued to exist and operate after
1992.
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14 As was the case in other post-communist states throughout Eastern Europe, Central Asia,
Africa and the Middle East,  the solutions adopted to save communist political parties
were numerous, with the likelihood of survival dependant on the success of ideological
and organisational reformulation (Møller & Skaaning 2010). It seems that a number of the
movements  in  Afghanistan  adopted  a  strategy  of what  Ziblatt calls  ‘leftist-retreat’
(Ziblatt  1998: 135)  whereby  communist  parties  re-evaluate  their  position  in  order  to
create a new vision of their ideology. Parties attempt to renew the concept of what it
means to be a socialist or, as Ziblatt wrote regarding the East German Party of Democratic
Socialism (PDS), they seek to ‘distance themselves from their Soviet-influenced origins in
order to return to an idealised ‘authentic’ pre-Soviet Marxist past’ (Ziblatt 1998: 129). The
Afghan Left  appears to have undertaken this particular transformation in a modified
form, as this vision has been adopted by members of the ruling PDPA as well as by radical
leftists who were part of  the opposition.  Many leftists believe that overt socialism is
unsuitable  for  Afghanistan,  but  a  number  of  groups  have  revised their  ideologies  in
search of something more suitable. This has caused movements to accept the history of
failure of leftist reform and to argue that its failure was inevitable due to the nature of
the entrenched social, political and economic order that characterises Afghanistan. 
15 Through undertaking a similar process of revising their understanding of Afghan history,
the LRA have attempted to fashion themselves a distinctive, more ‘authentic’  Marxist
position within the post-1992 landscape of the Afghan Left. They have attempted this by
undertaking a ‘leftist-retreat,’ whereby their ideology and political activities are rooted
to a belief that progress is achieved through a gradual process of workers’ organisation
and international solidarity, itself built on a return to an idealised form of communism
that gives precedence to the thought of Trotsky,  and to a lesser extent Marx,  at the
expense of Stalin and Mao.
 
History, ideology and political activities of the Left
Radical of Afghanistan
16 The article will now move on to explore the history, ideology and political activities of the
LRA after its formation during the post-PDPA landscape of Afghanistan. During 1996, the
LRA  came  into  existence  after  announcing  its  split  from the  Afghanistan  Liberation
Organisation (ALO) [Sazman-e Rihay-e Afghanistan], a Maoist political movement that traces
its history back to the 1970s, and which is itself a splinter from Shola. Formed in 1973, the
ALO is a movement that still declares Maoist thought as ‘its guiding theory,’ based on
which it ‘believes that a proletarian party, a people’s army and a united national front are
the indispensable means by which the masses in semi-colonial semi-feudal countries can
bring their anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution to victory.’21 The ALO was part of
the Maoist opposition to both the PDPA and the Mujahedeen and, according to its own
lore,  its  founder Dr.  Faiz  Ahmad was murdered in 1986 at  the hands of  Mujahedeen
militants  from  Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e  Islami .22 Since  the  fall  of  the  PDPA,  the  ALO  has
remained committed to its ideological position as a Maoist party and still believes that ‘…
the  services  rendered  by  Comrade  Mao  Zedong  were  paramount  and  his  mistakes
subordinate.’23 This belief in the importance of Mao is further expressed through their
disdain  for  the  current  iteration  of  China,  who  according  the  ALO,  have  betrayed
‘proletarian internationalism’ and have fallen ‘into the quagmire of  revisionism,’  and
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become ‘an exploiter and a superpower aggressor’ as a result of initiating the Xiaoping
reforms.24
17 Mainly comprised of ex-ALO members, the LRA also claims to have welcomed members
and affiliates from other leftist  groups,  including the Afghanistan People’s  Liberation
Organisation [Sazman-e Azadibakhsh-e Mardom-e Afghanistan—SAMA].25 The split took place
as a result of three main differences between the LRA faction and the leadership of the
ALO. First, there were disagreements surrounding revolutionary ideology, with the ALO
apparently content to work within the existing structures of Afghan society and make
alliances with members of Islamic groups and the population of educated, urban middle-
classes (what the ALO has termed the Afghan ‘national bourgeoisie’).26 Second, there was
a lack of democracy within the central committee of the ALO that prevented the LRA
faction from expressing its opinions about ideological reform and adaptations to political
organisation.27 And third, in what appears to be one of the most interesting differences,
the LRA’s apparent weariness with the ideology of Maoism and, in particular, with the
continued focus on peasants over workers, with the description of Afghanistan as a ‘semi-
feudal’ society and with the ALO’s acceptance of the Iranian revolution as progressive. For
the LRA, the ALO ‘ignored the class struggle and wanted to make a united front with the
enemies of workers and peasants.’28
18 This break can be seen as a fundamental shift in political ideology, as it moves the LRA
away  from  Maoism,  which  sees  Afghanistan  as  a  society  rooted  in the  traditional
landowner/peasant dichotomy, and re-positions it within the sphere of classical Marxist
argumentation that calls for the importance of the state and the working class as the
vanguard of revolution. For the LRA, Afghanistan should not be seen as comparable to
pre-communist  China,  but  congruent  with  modern  underdeveloped  states  that
participate  in  the  global  economic  system.  Indeed,  Afghanistan’s  domestic  economic
system, built on the accumulation of surplus capital by an indigenous capitalist elite class,
is definitively capitalist in nature.29 On the domestic political scene, and as former ALO
members, the LRA work with numerous other small proto-parties or groups, including:
the Afghanistan Socialist Association (ASA) [Jamiat-e Sosialisthai-e Afghanistan], the Afghan
Revolutionary  Organisation  (ARO)  [Sazman-e  Inqilabi-e  Afghanistan],  the  Afghanistan
Socialist Workers’ Organisation (ASWO) [Sazman-e- Sosialisthaie Kargri-e Afghanistan], and
the  Afghanistan Workers’  Organisation (AWO)  [Sazman-e  Kargran-e  Afghanistan].  All  of
these groups appear to share the LRA’s belief in anti-war politics and anti-imperialist
rejection of the NATO occupation, although they do not necessarily share the LRA’s desire
for developing international solidarity and organisation of workers.30 In addition,  the
groups come from a Maoist ideological background, but since the collapse of the PDPA
and  the  accession  to  power  of  the  Mujahedeen,  only  the  LRA  and  the  ASWO  have
attempted to reposition themselves in the international radical left outside of the MLM
tradition.31
19 While it is clear that the LRA comes from a Maoist-influenced background, and still draws
many of its contacts and connections from its previous incarnation as a faction of the
ALO, it has stated that it ‘prefers to work with leftists who have clearly rejected their past
program and ideological positions.’32 However, through their own admission, they have
yet to develop connections with other radical groups such as the SPA, and still tend to
draw  their  support  from  their  traditional  base  of  ex-ALO  members.33 The  key
requirements  for  individuals  wishing to join the LRA are that  they repudiate Maoist
revolutionary ideas, and their conceptualisation of the social structure of Afghanistan,
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and be open to the ideas of the radical left as understood by the LRA. The development of
the LRA can thus begin to be seen as an attempt, even though it was imposed upon them
through the necessity of history, to re-articulate what it means to be a leftist group in
Afghanistan.  They  appear  to  be  attempting  to  shift  the  focus  from  the  seemingly
impossible task of overthrowing the established capitalist state, or establishing Leninist
control over fragmented peasants and workers, to one of supporting small-scale workers’
dissent and building links within the international radical left.
20 The LRA declares that it is ‘not a typical Trotskyist party but it learns from him and
accepts his thoughts.’34 This is an interesting development among the Afghan Left,  as
Trotskyist movements do not appear to have any history in Afghanistan. The LRA declare
themselves to be a ‘radical left organisation’ working to build an ‘independent workers’
party’  in  Afghanistan,  based  on  commitment  to  ‘class  struggle  and  workers’
internationalism.’35 Afghanistan’s class structure has been defined by Maoists as semi-
feudal  in  nature,  structured  by  a  series  of  contractual  obligations  between  rich
landowners and peasants with similarities to pre-industrial, medieval Europe. The LRA
have declared this position to be obsolete and have attempted to re-categorise how they
understand Afghan capitalist development. Semi-feudal modes of production suggest that
Afghanistan is  pre-capitalist,  with a labour force made up of  peasants who work for
landlords in mainly agricultural pursuits, but, unlike in traditional feudal relations, the
peasants retain some form of control over their working lives (Thornor 1982). There is
little doubt that Afghanistan still retains these modes of production, especially in the
more  rural  areas  of  the  country;  however,  the  question  of  whether  peasants  have
diminished importance or remain viable as the potential vanguard of revolution has long
caused division among Afghan revolutionaries. Even though this debate seems somewhat
archaic  to  the  outsider,  in  Afghanistan  its  importance  should  not  be  understated.
Revolutionaries  believe  that  it  is  imperative  that  they  understand the  nature  of  the
economic system that  they and their  potential  comrades  live  under.36 As  a  result,  if
Afghan radicals reject the concept of Afghanistan retaining conditions similar to those of
medieval  Europe,  then  their  programme  of  political  activity  is  likely  to  undergo
significant revision.
21 The  LRA  support  the  view  that  Afghanistan’s  wage  labourers  exist  under  false
consciousness,  i.e.  rather  than  being  peasants,  they  are  in  fact  workers  subject  to
capitalist relations.37 The ongoing war that has beset Afghanistan since the arrival to
power of the PDPA has, according to the LRA, led to significant changes to the social
structure of the Afghan working-class and means that it was vital to undertake a revision
of  previously-sacrosanct  ideas  in  order  to  adjust  to  the  changes  that  history  had
presented. For example, the LRA are correct to argue that many Afghans now regularly
sell their labour as daily wage labourers and are paid by ‘capitalists in farms, buildings,
mines, road construction, brick-kiln, weaving-loom, fabrics, transportation, hotels and
restaurants, stores and harbours’ (New World 2001: §32).38 This belief is consistent with the
urbanising culture that has seen the populations of the cities rapidly increase since the
US  invasion  of  2001.  As  a  result  of  these  changes,  the  economic  reality  for  a  large
percentage of Afghans is that they are now subject to the daily grind of obtaining work in
the informal employment sector controlled by capitalists who made or increased their
fortunes during the US-led occupation, rather than operating as farmers in the fields of
landowning elites. This belief in the changed social, economic and political order means
the LRA’s position puts them in opposition to that of Afghan Maoists and has led them to
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seek alternatives through engaging with Trotskyist thought and with foreign groups from
the wider radical left.
22 The LRA’s ideology in relation to revolution is a consequence of this revised view of
Afghanistan’s  economic  structure.  One  of  the  key  aspects  of  Trotskyist  thinking  in
relation to post-World War II revolutions is the belief that the East European and Chinese
revolutions that led to Communist governments were ‘Stalinist,’ regardless of whether
the  USSR was  directly  involved,  as  in  Europe,  or  peripheral,  as  in  China  (Callinicos
1990: §7). This view is echoed by the LRA. For them, the distinction made between the
Maoists and PDPA is a false one. They view the disputes between the Maoists and the
PDPA as a function of their unwillingness to understand the true nature of Afghanistan’s
social structure. They believe that the enmity between the PDPA and Maoists was not
based  on  a  disagreement  over  ideology,  and  that  both  sides  believed  in  top-down
revolution.  The  disagreements  were  merely  over  which  social  class  should  be  the
vanguard of the revolution according to each group: the intelligentsia and the armed
forces  as  understood  by  the  PDPA,  or  the  peasantry  as  espoused  by  their  Maoist
opponents.39 For the LRA both of these views were historically inaccurate and constituted
a rejection of Marxist thought, and are, in essence and effect, Stalinist in character (New
World 2001: §31-36).  For  the  LRA,  the  Afghan  peasants,  who  exist  under  false
consciousness, and the military and intellectual elites, in thrall to a foreign power, are
both likely to be ‘reactionary’ in nature and, as such, they should not and could not be the
starting point for revolutionary activity in Afghanistan.40
23 On the subject of the aims of the Trotskyist revolutionary party, Callinicos notes that they
should  aim to  break  up the  ‘…old  state  apparatus’  and replace  it  with  one  ‘…under
workers’ direct and democratic control’ (1990: §10). Achieving a ‘…complete overthrow of
the existing state’ and its institutions of bureaucratic control is indeed a stated aim of the
LRA, although they fully accept this is more of an overarching revolutionary ideal than a
realistic possibility.41 The LRA is an organisation that is comparable to other non-Afghan
radical parties in that they appear to have two goals:  raising class consciousness and
establishing a new political apparatus. Their activities are predicated on their ideological
belief that they need to dismantle the structures of the existing state. However, they
appear to understand that the only realistic goal is to organise workers and activists in
order to seek social change that will have a direct impact on the lives of workers and
peasants. These two positions sometimes come into direct tension, but due to the LRA’s
small size, limited finances, and understanding of the political environment in which they
operate, they are fully aware that the goal of class solidarity takes precedence over any
desire for a mass-mobilised revolution.42
24 Underpinning  the  LRA’s  political  concerns  is  their  stated  adherence  to  three  main
principles:  ‘…class  struggle,  mass  revolution  and  workers’  internationalism.’43 These
statements  provide  further  evidence  that  the  LRA’s  ideology  draws  on  orthodox
Trotskyism and classical Marxism.44 Class struggle is achieved through the constant need
to educate and ‘enhance the class consciousness of the working class and liberate workers
from their attachment to religion and Jihad.’45 Mass revolution, as discussed above, is
understood to be an overarching goal even if it is not a realistic objective. However, they
believe that when working towards social change, it is not sufficient to support or call for
a revolution from above, as undertaken by the PDPA, or to support the establishment of a
government headed by a militant peasantry as requested by the Maoists. For the LRA,
only a mass-participation revolution led by workers will have any chance of changing the
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structure  of  Afghanistan  and  its  ruling  class.46 In  addition,  and  to  provide  further
evidence of their debt to Trotsky, it is never enough to seek national liberation without a
similar concern for international liberation. For the LRA, Afghanistan is not an island, it is
a component of the global system, and the problems suffered by Afghan workers are ‘tied
with the interest of all world workers’ (New World 2001: §45).
25 Examining  the  views  of  the  LRA  on  the  future  of  Afghanistan  also  provides  clues
regarding their ideological beliefs.  They believe that the Left should unite and create
direct  opposition  to  what  it  sees  as  the  forces  of  reaction:  ex-Mujahedeen,  Western
political  domination  and  the  Taleban.  In  this  regard,  the  LRA  exists  on  a  political
spectrum that places it in opposition to most currents of leftist successor ideology in
Afghanistan.  Many leftist  successor parties have registered as legal  entities and have
positioned themselves within the existing political framework as conceived by the US and
its allies. For the LRA, one of the most important current objectives is supporting the
removal of the US and NATO from Afghanistan, as they feel that until the occupation has
ended, no real progress can be made.47 Whilst they accept that areas of the country will
fall to the Taleban, they believe that only when Afghanistan is free from ‘imperialism’ of
any  kind  will  conditions  be  suited  for  the  establishment  of  an  indigenous  workers’
movements that could act as the vanguard of revolution. For the LRA, the only path that
can be  successful  is  an  Afghan solution supported  by  external  solidarity;  any  quasi-
colonial state structure is designed to fail the people of Afghanistan.48 The LRA also stands
in opposition to the Taleban, and other forces that stand against NATO, as it calls for the
creation of  a  state  of  complete  equality  between the  various  ethnic  groups  and the
liberation of women through the end of ‘chauvinism.’49
26 Clearly, and repeatedly, the LRA outline ideological similarities with Trotskyist thought.
They have based their ideological development on views that challenge the orthodoxies
of Afghan leftists and appear to explain the many failures and disasters of the experiment
with  left-wing  politics  that  took  place  in  Afghanistan  after  1978  through  a  radical
reinterpretation of recent history. It is clear that, ideologically, the LRA has made an
attempt to move away from its Maoist past—the question is why? There are numerous
structural reasons behind this shift away from past positions, both internal and external.
The internal  reasons  are  based around the  fact  that  left-wing political  thought,  and
anything seen as remotely ‘atheist’ by a majority of Afghans, had been fatally damaged by
the wreckage of the PDPA-era. For Afghan leftists, there has been a legitimate case to
review the failures of the PDPA government and its counterpoint Maoist insurrection. In
addition,  ostensibly  leftist  individuals  and  groups  have  been  forced  to  undertake
ideological reform to shift their views for pragmatic reasons of survival in the challenging
environment of the Mujahedeen victory, Taleban takeover and US-led occupation. During
this period there were also external forces at work that have played a significant part in
the development of leftist political thought in Afghanistan. In the wake of the collapse of
the USSR and the ascension of China into the capitalist  order,  ex-communist parties,
whether  in  government  or  opposition,  have  had  to  attend  to  the  changed  political
structure of a ‘post-communist’ political system.
27 This appears to be the fundamental truth behind the LRA’s change of ideology: without
any external support and the political reality of a failed revolution from above, it was
imperative  that  they  formulate  a  new  ideological  position.  For  the  LRA,  the  Saur
Revolution led to a situation where alliances were fostered between leftist Maoist and
religious Mujahedeen factions, in opposition to the ‘Stalinist’ PDPA government. These
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alliances, made for strategic purposes, served to undermine any possibility of a leftist
replacement for the PDPA. This meant that once the PDPA was ousted from power, the
Maoists realised they had not aligned with ‘freedom fighters’ searching for a just and
progressive  Afghanistan,  but  merely  allied  themselves  with  opposing  forces  with  a
radical,  yet,  reactionary political ideology. In a world without a functioning left-wing
state  capable  of  providing  material  support,  alongside  the  almost  universal  Afghan
rejection of any political movement resembling leftist ideology, there were only three
choices  available  to  a  political  movement  such  as  the  LRA:  retreat  to  their  view of
Maoism,  revise  their  view of  Maoism and move towards  another  leftist  tradition,  or
discard their ideological position completely, as many ex-PDPA individuals and groups
did after 1992. As stated in the previous section, it appears that the LRA have attempted a
reformed ‘leftist-retreat’  and are still  committed to the ideals and ideas of the leftist
tradition.
28 Examining the importance placed by the LRA on political activities linked to Trotskyist
thought will allow us to understand their political evolution into a radical leftist front
with limited connection to Maoist concerns. However, before undertaking this review,
the article will first address the issue of the LRA’s membership level as this has direct
implications on their political activities. Unfortunately, and despite numerous requests, it
has not been possible to ascertain the membership level of the LRA.50 This presents a
number of problems, not least by preventing the article from being able to establish with
any certainty the LRA’s importance with regards to its level of support within the current
Afghan political system. In line with previous scholarship on leftist party membership,
and through understanding  the  traditional  lack  of  attachment  to  political  parties  in
Afghanistan, it can be assumed that LRA membership is very low (Giustozzi 2000: 253).
This low number of members, while suggesting that the LRA will not be able to instigate
any form of mass mobilisation, highlights the LRA’s own stated position as a rejectionist
group, tied to its working-class roots. It understands that it operates in an environment
of radical opposition, with its main objectives being to build solidarity amongst workers
as opposed to focusing on breaking down the capitalist order.
29 The  LRA  believe  that  the  current  comprador-bourgeois make-up of  the  Afghan  state
structure  prevents  any  socialist,  secular  or  atheist  organisations  from being  able  to
operate as viable political  concerns.51 As a result they do not see involvement in the
existing  US-sponsored  ‘democratic’  system as  being  beneficial  to  their  campaign  for
rights  and equality  for  workers,  and have limited their  engagement  to  oppositionist
tactics  such  as  taking  part  in  demonstrations  and  organising  clandestine  political
discussion circles.52 However, the LRA admit to working within legal processes such as
external workers’ solidarity campaigns, which suggests that they believe it can be of some
benefit to work within the current political structure when their political objectives can
be promoted.53 Participation in demonstrations against NATO occupation have also been a
hallmark of the LRA’s engagement in Afghan politics and in 2005 three members were
arrested by the Afghan National Police, which led to solidarity messages being sent from
international parties and trade unions in the US and Europe.54 All of these activities are
comparable to the activities of radical leftist groups in other countries—an attitude of
rejection, resistance and underground political organisation as opposed to taking part in
the processes of democracy as decided upon by elites.
30 Leftist parties in America and Japan have demonstrated some connections with the LRA.
For  example,  the  LRA’s  English  theoretical  publication  New  World [ Dunia-e  Naw] is
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published on the website of the Japanese leftist group known as ‘Internationalism.’ In
addition,  the  Freedom  Socialist  Party,  a  US-based  socialist  party,  with  roots  in
Trotskyism, that split from the Socialist Workers Party of the United States, has published
a letter from the LRA that calls for the immediate removal of NATO troops as a result of
the widely reported Panjwai massacre in Kandahar Province, where a US soldier killed 16
civilians.55 Commitment  to  solidarity  with  like-minded  socialist  groups  outside  of
Afghanistan has  also been a  hallmark of  recent  LRA activity and they have shared ‘
documents,  newsletters,  and  declarations’  and  participated  in  events  with  political
groups based in Pakistan, Iran and India.56 In addition, the chair of the LRA meetings
undertook a visit to Mumbai, India, as the LRA were invited to take part in a regional
solidarity conference involving political parties and trade unions, including members of
the All Pakistan Trade Unions Federation.57 This trip was undertaken to enable the LRA
organising committee to raise awareness of  Afghan leftist  politics,  as  well  as  to gain
insight into the formation of  a legitimate workers-led union.  It  is  clear that for LRA
members the formation of an active general trade union led by and for workers is the
foundational bedrock of their revolutionary political activities.58 However due to a lack of
funds, a stated focus on national issues, and despite numerous requests from regional and
international  organisations,  it  has  not  been  possible  for  the  LRA  to  join  a  socialist
international  in  an active  or  observer  capacity.59 The general  lack of  engagement  in
international conferences and inability to join a socialist international has clearly limited
the exposure of the LRA and may be one of the reasons why they have failed to develop a
more widely-known political program.
31 Another key political activity highlighted by the LRA is its use of ‘entryist’ tactics within
existing organisations such as local NGOs and civil society groups. Entryism is the process
of operating within an existing organisation to enable the LRA to gain access to potential
recruits  through  promoting  its  ideology  without  the  need  to  operate  as  a  political
movement.60 One of the most recent examples of the use of entryism took place in the
aftermath of the Abkhorak mine explosion in Samangan Province, northern Afghanistan.
This disaster led to the deaths of 27 Afghan miners, all of whom were working without
adequate  safety  protection,  insurance  or  equipment  (TOLONews.com 2013).  In  the
aftermath, the LRA claim to have operated in the region through a civil society group and
helped distribute solidarity aid to the families of the victims. They did not conduct open
political activities, but helped the families of the victims question the lack of protection
provided by the mine owners and the lack of  support that they were offered by the
Government  of  Afghanistan.61 In  addition  to  these  activities,  the  LRA  as a  political
movement openly submitted calls for an inquiry and a solidarity fund to be provided by
the mine owners and the Afghan Government, and published articles in support of the
victims and their families.62
32 Perhaps the most important example of the LRA’s commitment to small-scale political
action over large-scale utopian projects is their demonstrated commitment to workers’
solidarity. The LRA conducts regular bi-monthly meetings at the houses of LRA members
in Kabul. These meetings are held with up to ten members (plus non-member guests) and
are led and convened by the organising committee of the group.63 The LRA generally
splits these regular meetings split into three separate parts. The first acts as a general
discussion of politics in Afghanistan, with a detailed focus on the situation of workers in
Kabul. During the second, workers discuss their issues with the organising committee and
are offered advice and support on how to solve their work-related problems through
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organising collective responses. For example, during the first LRA meeting, one of the
workers  talked  at  length  of  the  safety  risks  they  are  exposed  to  in  the
telecommunications sector, and how the management of these organisations often pay
little attention to the lives of their employees, some of whom had died on the job.64 The
third section is conducted by the chair of the meeting, and its purpose is to discuss the
development of their key objective: the formation of what is best described as ‘one big
union’—the formation of a workers-led and operated general trade union that will unite
disparate Kabuli wage labourers and enable them to speak with one voice to both the
government and their employers.65
33 In order to promote the cause of trade unionism in Afghanistan, the chair of the meeting
on 6 December 2012 presented a document outlining some of the key needs for a trade
union representing workers across all  industrial  sectors in Kabul.  This document was
from the  ‘The  Coordination Committee  and Dispute  Resolution to  Create  the  Labour
Union,’ and presented an outline of the objectives with regards to the formation of a
Kabul-based manual workers general trade union. For example, the document states that
the ‘…committee’s goal is to create a bylaw for the formation of the labour union, not a
specific group or organization.’66 This is important because ‘…to end the dire situation of
both the ideal and the movement we need to come together as one, we cannot achieve
anything by being in groups, dispersed and disunited.’67 Perhaps this statement should be
seen as utopian, bearing in mind the history of enmity and division among the Afghan
Left; however, at its core is a message that should be seen as compatible with the LRA’s
current understanding of  the political  environment in which they function and their
belief in small-scale workers’ organisations. The production of the document, and the
creation of a coordination committee focused on this issue, shows that the LRA is taking
its  responsibilities towards its  members and associates seriously.  By calling for unity
among the Afghan Left, as expressed through the establishment of a workers-led general
trade union, the LRA appear to be continuing with a political activity that complements
their revised political ideology, whereby they understand their group as a post-Maoist
organisation with more than a passing resemblance to other Trotsky-influenced, radical
leftist political movements.
 
Conclusion: the relevance of the Left Radical of
Afghanistan
34 After breaking away from their parent organisation, the Afghan Liberation Organisation,
in 1996 the cadres of the Left Radical of Afghanistan created a political movement and
workers’ association that aimed to move away from its Maoist past. This study attempts
to position the LRA within the spectrum of what is understood about left-wing thought in
Afghanistan and shows that their adoption of an ideology influenced by Trotsky appears
to be a novel development. It shows that the LRA established itself as radical leftist in
orientation, with ideological similarities to international socialist and Trotskyist groups,
although its working-class origins ensure it remains a grassroots rather than intellectual
movement. This development is important because there has been a lack of research into
the way that Afghan political groups from the leftist tradition have attempted to revise
their ideological and organisational positions after 1992.
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35 Because  of  its  limited  size,  and  the  illegality  of  its  operations,  the  LRA  should  be
understood as a minor group with little chance of penetrating the Afghan working class
and, as such, its importance within the political and ideological landscape of Afghanistan
is limited.  However,  as  suggested throughout this  article,  the LRA is  interesting as a
subject of analysis because its very existence provides evidence that underground leftist
activity and agitation can be re-articulated around workers’ solidarity and opposition to
the status quo without being connected to the political programmes of grassroots Islamic
movements, elite-dominated groups built around entrenched leaders or unreconstructed
political  movements  with  roots  in  the  1960s.  The  LRA have  rejected  the  ideological
constraints that they believe have limited the Afghan Left, and at the same time remain
in opposition to the US-led occupation and existing capitalist order. They have achieved
this  both by design and through circumstance,  and have positioned themselves  as  a
radical  left-wing political  movement committed to class-struggle and the rejection of
divisions based on ethnicity, tribalism or nationalism. They draw their membership from
members of Kabul’s working-class and attempt to connect their domestic concerns to a
wider understanding of workers’ internationalism. Due to their limited funds and small
size, they are well aware that their objectives must be small-scale and long-term. Their
essential desire is to use their distinctive ideological position to develop a base of support
among urban workers through the establishment of a successful workers-led trade union.
They hope to build on this base by taking part in solidarity efforts with likeminded leftist
groups domestically, regionally and internationally and by promoting their agenda more
widely.
36 It is clear that there is much work to be done to gain a full and detailed understanding of
the trajectory of left-wing political groups in Afghanistan as each movement is defined by
its  own  particular  history,  ideologies  and  organisational  structure.  However,  the
existence of a group such as the LRA shows that, through a process of ideological reform
and a re-articulation of the goals a left-wing group should work towards, it is still possible
within  the  complex  political,  economic  and  social  geography  of  Afghanistan  for
movements  of  the  Left  to  maintain  a  form  of  political  organisation  and  ideological
cohesion.
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NOTES
1. The author would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments: Brian Roper,
Najib Lafraie, Thomas Ruttig, Abdus Shuman, Bradley Atkinson, the three anonymous reviewers
and editors of SAMAJ. He would also like to thank the members of the LRA and their families for
their hospitality and openness. Any mistakes and/or omissions remain my own.
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2. The  author  first  became aware  of  the  existence  of  the  LRA after  being  provided with  an
anonymous email address by an Afghan contact. Next, a series of email exchanges with the LRA’s
self-declared  ‘Foreign  Affairs  Representative’  Nasir  Loyand  was  undertaken.  Through  this
engagement,  Loyand  agreed  to  take  part  in  a  number  of  email  interviews  and  eventually
provided the text of the LRA’s New World (Dunia-e Naw). Following this, a research trip to Kabul,
Afghanistan was arranged in 2013-14 and the author cultivated communication with members of
the LRA. Subsequently, interviews with the pseudonymous ‘Ahmad Noor’ were secured and he
provided oral testimony regarding the LRA’s ideology and organisation. This led to invitations to
spend  time  with  LRA  activists  during  two  bi-monthly  meetings  that  took  place  at  private
residences of members in two separate working-class districts of Kabul in December 2013 and
February 2014. This article relies on two key informants from the LRA, Nasir Loyand (activist
living in Peshawar, Pakistan) and Ahmad Noor (teacher from Nangarhar, Afghanistan). Both of
these names are pseudonyms and are used in order to protect their status as activists in an
underground movement.
3. The term ‘association’  or ‘group’ or ‘movement’  is  used interchangeably in order to avoid
usage of the term ‘party’ as the available evidence on the LRA suggests that there is no ‘collection
of communities’ built around variants of the ‘caucus,’  ‘branch,’ ‘cell’  or ‘militia,’  but simply a
loose association of left-wing workers with similar political ideologies (Duverger 1967: 17-36).
Similarly, the term ‘faction’ has been avoided, except when referring to the LRA as unit within
the ALO, in order to prevent any negative connotations (Sartori 1976: 3-13).
4. It  is  understood  that  the  nature  of  the  term  ‘Afghan’  is  highly  contested  and  is  usually
synonymous with ‘Pashtun,’ ‘Pakhtun,’ or ‘Pathan’ identity. There was no attempt to press the
LRA on this  concept as they appear to use the legalised term as a catch-all  to allow for the
universalisation  of  all  ethnic  groups  that  live  within  the  geographical  space  known  as
‘Afghanistan’ (Allan 2001).
5. The chair of the LRA meetings worked as a labourer for a telecommunications company and
the oldest member of the group was employed as a road sweeper, with his salary paid by the
government (Field notes, 20 February 2014).
6. For example,  the by-laws of  the Democratic  Homeland Party of  Afghanistan [Hezb-e  Milli-e
Watan-e Afghanistan], one of the main successor parties of the PDPA, repeatedly underline their
nationalist credentials at the expense of their socialist past. The Solidarity Party of Afghanistan [
Hezb-e Hambastagi-e  Afghanistan]  appears to be one leftist  organisation with a similar political
agenda to the LRA and, while important for future work, it is outside the scope of this paper to
undertake a direct comparison of their ideological similarities and differences.
7. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, Foreign Affairs Representative of the LRA,
28 December 2012. There is, at this moment in time, no way of accurately testing this claim.
8. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 25 October 2014.
9. Field notes,  6  December 2013.  See note 4  for further elaboration on the concept  of  being
‘Afghan.’
10. This is despite their purported belief in female emancipation. Essentially the cultural reality
of Afghanistan takes precedence over ideological purity.
11. Prayers are held by the group during their meetings, although these appear to take the form
of a collective prayer before lunch and not individual or collective prayers as would be expected
in a highly religious group.
12. Field notes from LRA activist meetings, 6 December 2013 and 20 February 2014, Kabul. The
LRA claim to hold meetings in other parts of Afghanistan, although this has not been confirmed.
13. For  more  insights  into  proto-left-wing,  radical  political  party  development  and  leftist
agitation in Afghanistan see, for example, Castagné (1935), Marwat (1997), Emadi (2001), Ruttig
(2006),  Behzan  (2012),  Ibrahimi  (2012),  Giustozzi  (2013)  and  Ruttig  (2013).  Halliday’s  work
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published in the New Left Review and The Nation (1978-81) and Louis Dupree’s series ‘Red Flag Over
the Hindu Kush’ (1979-80) both provide detailed and illuminating accounts of the early PDPA-era.
14. The Baku Congress was held in September 1920, during the early years of Afghanistan’s King
Amanullah-led  attempts  at  social  reform,  and  was  attended  by  a  wide  variety  of  political
revolutionaries from across Asia. According to the delegate list, an Afghan communist known as
‘Aga-Zade’  and a non-party member known as ‘Azim’ were both in attendance with another,
‘Kara-Tadzhiyev,’ also noted to have attended (Congress of the Peoples of the East, 1920, First
Session:  §2;  Seventh  Session:  §11).  The  stenographic  report  does  not  collate  any  figures  for
‘Afghans.’  This  anomaly  can perhaps  be  explained by their  collation into  ethnicities  such as
‘Hazaras’ and ‘Tadzhiks’ and ‘Uzbeks’ amongst others, although no ‘Pashtun,’ or variants thereof,
are  listed.  This  information  is  available  at:  https://www.marxists.org/history/international/
comintern/baku/delegates.htm. For those wishing to read in more detail about the discussions at
Baku, the proceedings are available online at: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/
comintern/baku/index.htm.
15. Interview with Abdur Rashid Arian, ex-PDPA Politburo Member, Kabul, 28 October 2013.
16. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 28 December 2012.
17. Interview with Abdur Rashid Arian, ex-PDPA Politburo Member, Kabul, 28 October 2013.
18. Democratic Homeland Party of Afghanistan [Hezb-e Milli-e  Watan-e Afghanistan]  (2014) ‘By-
Laws of the Democratic Homeland Party of Afghanistan’,  translated from Dari by Mohammad
Zafar Salehi [unpublished].
19. Interview with Shah Nawaz Tanai, PDPA Defence Minister, Kabul, 26 March 2014. Tanai did
not admit his movement was Pashtun nationalist in orientation, but his background as a Khaqi
radical,  his  purported  (although  denied)  links  with  Gulbuddin  Hekmatyar  and  the  fact  his
movement is named in Pashto suggests it takes this stance.
20. Although it is outside the scope of this article to undertake a comparison of their respective
ideologies, it appears that Solidarity is perhaps one of the closest movements to the LRA. For
example, the SPA are committed to secularism, women’s rights, democracy and opposition to the





25. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 28th December 2012.
26. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 28 December 2012.
27. The LRA claim that no congress or conference has ever been held by the ALO leadership to
discuss ideology and leadership. I have not been able to confirm or repudiate this point.
28. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 16 January 2014.
29. Interview with Ahmad Noor, LRA Activist and Nangarhar Representative, Kabul, 19 November
2013.
30. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 16 January 2014.
31. This has not yet been confirmed by the ASWO. As mentioned above, the SPA also appear to be
in the same bracket as self-declared radical leftists.
32. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 16 January 2014.
33. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 16 January 2014.
34. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 28 December 2012.
35. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 28 December 2012.
36. Interview with Ahmad Noor, Kabul, Afghanistan, 19 November 2013.
37. Interview with Ahmad Noor, Kabul, Afghanistan, 19 November 2013.
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38. New  World ( Dunia-e  Naw)—‘A  political-theoretical  publication  of  the  Left  Radical  of
Afghanistan (LRA)’ is the only organ of the LRA that has been published internationally and in
English.
39. Interview with Ahmad Noor, Kabul, 19 November 2013.
40. Interview with Ahmad Noor, Kabul, 19 November 2013.
41. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 4 January 2013.
42. The specific focus on workers’ solidarity and on addressing concerns of individual workers
was especially apparent at the December 2013 LRA meeting (Field notes, 6 December 2013).
43. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 4 January 2013.
44. In New World the LRA use the Marxist slogan ‘Workers of the world, unite!’ on more than one
occasion and it seems to be a key refrain of their political outlook.
45. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 16 January 2014.
46. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 4 January 2013.
47. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 28 December 2012.
48. Interview with Ahmad Noor, Kabul, 19 November 2013.
49. Interview with Ahmad Noor, Kabul, 19 November 2013.
50. The  LRA’s  position  on  this  topic  is  that,  for  political  reasons,  it  cannot  provide  any
information on membership numbers.  Without any verified information on this  topic,  it  will
continue to be difficult to assess the LRA’s importance with regards to membership numbers.
51. A  comprador is  ‘a  person  who  acts  as  an  agent  for  foreign  organisations  engaged  in
investment,  trade,  or  economic  or  political  exploitation’  (Oxford  Dictionaries 2014).  The  term
‘comprador bourgeois’ in this sense should be seen to mean the alliance of the Afghan elite and
middle classes with foreign economic, social and political institutions and governments.
52. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 4 January 2013.
53. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 4 January 2013.
54. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 4 January 2013.
55. Freedom Socialist Party, http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/?q=node/1869.
56. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 4 January 2013.
57. Field notes, 20 February 2014.
58. Left Radical of Afghanistan [Chap-e Radikal-e Afghanistan] (2014) The Coordination Committee
and Dispute Resolution to Create the Labour Union [Draft] (‘Aqrab 1392), translated from Dari by
Mohammad Jawad [unpublished].
59. Personal email communication with Nasir Loyand, 28 December 2012.
60. This  is  a  key requirement of  political  organisation because,  as  the LRA are a  group that
promotes secularism, they are an illegal organisation under the current Afghan constitution.
61. Interview with Ahmad Noor, Kabul, 19 November 2013.
62. Left Radical of Afghanistan [Chap-e Radikal-e Afghanistan] (2013) ‘The families of died mine
workers,  need  your  support’, Supporting  Committee  of  the  Victims  of  Samangan Coal  Mine,
translated from Dari by Nasir Loyand [unpublished].
63. Field notes, 6 December 2013.
64. Field notes, 6 December 2013.
65. As  Ruttig  (2014)  shows,  there  is  a  limited  yet  ongoing  history  of  labour  movements  in
Afghanistan  and  one  national  organisation,  the  National  Union  of  Afghanistan  Workers  and
Employees [Ittehadia-ye Melli-ye Kargaran wa Karmandan-e Afghanistan], is currently in operation.
There was no suggestion that the LRA wanted to work with this existing union due to its reported
ex-PDPA connections and the LRA commitment to grassroots organisation.
66. Left Radical of Afghanistan [Chap-e Radikal-e Afghanistan] (2014) The Coordination Committee
and Dispute Resolution to Create the Labour Union [Draft] (‘Aqrab 1392), translated from Dari by
Mohammad Jawad, §6 [unpublished].
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67. Left Radical of Afghanistan [Chap-e Radikal-e Afghanistan] (2014) The Coordination Committee
and Dispute Resolution to Create the Labour Union [Draft] (‘Aqrab 1392), translated from Dari by
Mohammad Jawad, §5 [unpublished].
ABSTRACTS
Leftist political thought and organisation in Afghanistan is generally thought to be represented
by  two  broad  ideological  trends:  Marxist-Leninist  and  Marxist-Leninist-Maoist  (MLM).  These
disparate and factionalised groups sought ideological, political and economic support from the
USSR  and  China  and,  during  the  fractious  period  of  rule  by  the  Soviet-backed  People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) [Hezb-e-Demokratic-e-Khalq-e Afghanistan],  they became
entrenched in political  enmity and violence.  This  period came to an elongated end with the
removal of Soviet troops in 1989, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the removal of Najibullah as
President in 1992 and the ensuing civil-war. It was from this milieu that, in 1996, the Left Radical
of Afghanistan (LRA) [Chap-e Radikal-e Afghanistan] was formed by a group of ex-Maoist Afghan
political refugees living in Peshawar, Pakistan. The LRA is a small, urban, Kabul-based political
and workers’  association that  traces  its  history  to  the  MLM tradition.  It  has  little  domestic,
regional  or  international  support and its  existence does  not  point  towards a  radical  shift  in
political organisation and ideology in Afghanistan. Yet, the LRA provides evidence of how left-
wing  political  thought  in  Afghanistan  functions,  in  this  case  as  a  re-articulated  ideology  of
resistance influenced by Trotsky. The article traces the history, ideology and activities of the LRA
and attempts to place them in context. However, the main purpose is to provide a space through
which to understand, on its own terms and in its own words, the nature of the LRA as a working-
class, left-wing, Afghan political and workers’ association.
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